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INTRODUCTION 
Both the European Union and the United States are engaged in the 
"restructuring" of their electricity industries. In a major conceptual break 
from the past, both societies see that specially designed markets can 
function in that industry. Yet, while market strategies are feasible in the 
generation and distribution/marketing segments, the bulk or wholesale 
transmission segment-the "big wires" that connect the generators with the 
consumers-challenges market solutions. The EU Commission has 
recently proposed a new round of restructuring legislation, known as the 
"third package." The EU reforms rely generally on command-and-control 
regulation to assure the public regarding performance by bulk transmission 
entities. The U.S. experience suggests that the European Union is trying to 
"do it the hard way." The United States has been moving to an 
organizational model known in U.S. administrative law as "collaborative 
governance." Collaborative governance concentrates on broad 
participation, inclusion of all the stakeholders, and transparency to assure 
the public regarding performance. This article examines the problems 
identified in the third package as they might be met-and to a large extent 
as they have been met in the U.S.-by the collaborative governance 
approach. Its goal is to generate a transatlantic dialogue on these issues. 
The U.S. electricity industry has evolved a collaborative governance 
model and that model now dominates U.S. electricity restructuring. 
Significantly, the shift to this organizational model has been driven by the 
industry and market participants with government encouragement rather 
than command. Collaborative governance concentrates on joint problem 
solving and controlled discretion. 1 It strives to be inclusive rather than 
adversarial by bringing into the governing entity itself all the stakeholders. 
It is based on public/private collaboration, founded on the interaction 
among governmental and private governmental-type entities. Because it is 
controlled by those directly affected, it naturally gravitates to 
1. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REv. I, 22 (1997); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REv. 1285 (2003); see also Sallyanne Payton, "Professionalism as Third-Party 
Governance: The Function and Dysfunction of Medicare," in MAKING GOVERNMENT 
MANAGEABLE: EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 112-40 (Thomas H.Stanton & Benjamin Ginsberg ed., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 
2004). Professor Payton has for years explored this concept in her course "Law of 
Cooperative Federalism." 
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organizational structures dictated by technical and economic realities, 
rather than insisting on suboptimum political boundaries. Discussed below 
is the emerging U.S. collaborative governance model and how this model 
might address the problems recently identified by the EU authorities? 
I. SHARED PROBLEM 
For generations, both Europe and the U.S. policymakers have assumed 
that the market cannot serve the public interest in the electricity industry. 
They assumed that the most efficient industry form is a monopoly or at 
least that the larger the firms, the better. The governmental task then 
seemed to be control of the market domination inherent in this industry 
structure. In the United States, the solution was regulated private 
monopolies while Europe tended toward state-managed monopolies. 
Today, on collective reflection, both societies now see that specially 
structured markets can be an improvement over either direct regulation or 
direct government control. 
A pure market solution in all electricity regimes is challenged by three 
characteristics. First, the product is totally undifferentiated. Second, the 
product cannot be economically stored and hence it is the ultimate 
perishable commodity. Third, it cannot be directed from a source to a 
specific end user but must be made to flow toward that user. This last 
characteristic creates the greatest challenge to market solutions. 
Identifying an actual exchange of a particular product between the producer 
and the consumer is at best a fiction. A generator adds some artificially 
designated quantity of electricity into the flow and a consumer "pulls" 
those artificially designated units out of the flow. The generator may 
charge for adding the quantity and the consumer may be charged for taking 
that quantity out, but only in the most abstract and largely dysfunctional 
way may a consumer be said to purchase the electricity from a specific 
producer.3 Yet, while the producer does not actually sell the electricity 
2. The most recent iteration of the EU electricity policy is called the Third Package. 
Two proposals in this Third Package are the focus of this discussion: "Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/54/EC of 
the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity et al." (hereinafter Internal Market Proposal); "Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council Amending Regulation (EC) No. 
1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchange in electricity" 
(hereinafter Cross-Border Proposal). The Third Package was supported by a Commission 
study: "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy" 
(2006) (hereinafter Electricity Green Paper). 
3. The market obstacles presented by these characteristics can be envisioned by 
considering a person in Spain buying a cup of water from someone in the United States. The 
person in the United States delivers the water by pouring it into the Atlantic Ocean; the 
purchaser dips a cup of water out of the Ocean. In theoretical compliance with the contract, 
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produced to the consumer, it is increasingly recognized that a market 
solution can be pursued. The generators may be made to compete and the 
consumers may capture the benefits from this competitive market. In order 
to do so, however, the market solution must be adjusted to the special nature 
of electricity. These industry characteristics present a conundrum for every 
designer of a public-regarding electricity industry, American (both 
continents), European, Asian, and increasingly the remainder of the world.4 
The first step is segregation of the three major segments of the industry 
and developing competition in production and distribution/marketing. The 
PJM website offers a helpful illustration of how an electric power system 
operates.5 
II. PROFILE OF THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM6 
Both EU and U.S. restructuring then begins with "unbundling" these 
three segments-i.e., separating control (and/or ownership) of generation, 
bulk transmission, and distribution/marketing. 
Bulk transmission presents the challenge. In a pure market approach, 
the generators must "buy" competitively priced transmission and that price 
must be included in the retail price. Unfortunately, bulk or wholesale 
transmission-the "big wires" that connect the generators with the 
consumers-do in fact meet the condition for a "natural monopoly."7 An 
ordinary market in transmission is inefficient, if not impossible. On the 
other hand, control of the big wires represents a dominant, "bottleneck" 
position which can cancel the market solutions in the generation and 
distribution/marketing segments. Thus, the challenge in creating an 
electricity market is structuring a market-friendly bulk transmission system 
the seller delivered a cup into the system and the buyer took a cup out. Yet it is hard to even 
claim that the buyer bought the seller's water. The transportation of the seller's cup never 
really takes place and the cup withdrawn really comes from an unidentifiable source. This is 
electricity. One operating abstraction has been the "contract path fiction," in which everyone 
ignores reality. This fiction creates distortions in the market of electricity. Answers begin 
with thinking outside the bilateral contract thinking. 
4. See generally Thomas von Danwitz, Regulation and Liberalization of the European 
Market-A German View, 27 ENERGY L.J. 423 (2006); Tun-jen Cheng & Chung-min Tsai, 
"Powering Rent-Seeking in China's Electricity Industry," in RENT-SEEKING IN CHINA, (Tag-
wing Ngo & Yong-ping Wu eds. 2008); Larry Pascal, South American Electricity-2006 
Year in Review, 13 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 335 (2007). 
5. Profile of an Electric Power System, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjmlhow-we-
operate.aspx. 
6. Profile of the Electricity System, http://www.pjm.com/about/overview.html. 
7. A "natural monopoly" exists where the firm's average cost continues to fall within 
any feasible range of production and hence one producer can produce all requirements at the 
lowest cost. JACK HIRSHLEIFER & DAVID HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 
241-42 (6th ed. 1998). In electricity, the advantage derives not just from "economies of 
scale" but also a vague concept called "subadditivity." PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRIC 
UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COMPETITIVE ERA 8 ( 1997). 
2009] COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 75 
in light of the three special characteristics of the electricity. 
The challenge then is to enable a competitive market among generators 
and retail marketers-industries we now understand may efficiently 
operate under conditions of competition-when the producers can only be 
said to add to the flow from which the distributors/marketers draw when 
the flow is controlled by a bottleneck entity. For most of the 20th century, 
the solution was a vertically integrated utility that generated, transported, 
and marketed the electricity. The consumer simply contracted with the 
utility; the rest of the operation was coordinated within the utility. The 
utility coordinated the generation, transmission, and marketing of 
electricity. This vertically integrated industry presented serious economic 
and social problems. 8 Since this monopolist could and did act as a 
monopolist, this structure presents the danger of a social "welfare loss" in 
which the system produces less electricity at a higher price than would a 
market. 9 This welfare loss was addressed by some sort of government 
intervention, either regulation or direct government management (i.e., 
nationalization). 
Both solutions created their own distortions, including inadequate 
control of the performance of the integrated entity. Regulation became 
more about politics and advocacy than efficiency. National ownership 
faced both direct political pressures and the inherent deficiencies of lack of 
economic incentives and bureaucratic decisionmaking. Both European and 
U.S. societies sought ways to break out of this box. The answer was sought 
in more nuanced market orientation and less direct government involvement. 
Yet the special nature of an electricity industry has not changed and the 
obstacles to a market approach are still present. In the end, the laws of 
physics still rule and the laws of man must still yield place to nature's laws. 
The United States and the European Union (and the world) share this 
problem and should dialogue on solutions. While this paper highlights an 
emerging U.S. solution, it does so to further a global dialogue. 
8. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten in the enthusiasm for market 
coordination that the "theory of the firm" literature demonstrates the potential efficiencies of 
this model: "[Firms were created for] two interrelated reasons: (1) to take advantage of team 
production, and (2) to reduce contracting costs." Hirshleifer, supra note 7, at 160. The 
second in particular should give some pause for the electricity unbundling projects. 
9. Hirshleifer, supra note 7, at 237 ("In comparison with the competitive outcome, 
monopoly involves a transfer from consumer to suppliers. There is also an efficiency 
loss .... "). 
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III. EVOLUTION OF U.S. ELECTRICITY POLICY 
A. Major Shift in U.S. Regulatory Strategy 
A major shift in the theory of U.S. electricity regulation started not with 
Congress or administrative authorities such as the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FER C) or the Department of Energy (DOE), but 
with antitrust litigation. 10 The story begins with the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Otter Tai/. 11 Since the end of the 19th century, the electricity 
industry was always considered a "natural monopoly" and hence ordinary 
application of the competition laws was deemed inappropriate. This theory 
spawned regulatory regimes in which rate and performance regulation aimed 
to create the performance of a competitive market while retaining the cost-
effectiveness of the monopoly. While some economists increasingly 
questioned this theory, a policy shift would not take place until the Supreme 
Court in Otter Tail found that competition was possible and that the 
electricity industry to the extent possible should incorporate market forces. 
Congress made a few tentative attempts to encourage a market 
approach. 12 However, it was FERC that initiated the first meaningful step 
toward restructuring the industry. The real beginning of efforts to inject 
market elements into the whole electricity industry was a FERC rule called 
Order 888. 13 This "open access rule" provided an impressive foundation 
for this restructuring. 14 Order 888 ordered functional unbundling, finding 
that ownership divestiture was not necessary. It sought to divide control of 
the three industry segments-generation, transmission, and 
distribution/marketing. A market in generation seemed plausible if the 
generators were separated from the integrated utilities. Likewise, a market 
10. The two most significant and lasting pieces of early energy legislation relevant to 
this discussion are Part II of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824a-825r, passed in 
1933, and the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 et seq., passed in 1938. 
11. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). This case is seminal 
because it recognized the possibility of competition in the electricity industry and hence 
began the restructuring movement. Significant even today is the example of abusive 
behavior by the large, integrated utility. The utility attempted to drive out competition from 
small municipal utilities that were able to sell electricity well below the dominant utility. 
Such conduct continues to be a potential danger. 
12. Major efforts include the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) 
(encouraging limited generator competition) and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (expanding 
the types of generators that could sell deregulated wholesale power). 
13. Order 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Cost by 
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) (hereinafter Order 888). 
14. It was adopted through the basic U.S. "legislative rules"-rules made pursuant to 
delegated authority which have the "power of law"-set out in § 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). The statement accompanying this rule is an impressive example of 
this process. 
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in distribution would be created if customers were able to choose among 
retail marketers. Again, the key was separating the distribution segment 
from the integrated utility. Markets at the two ends, so to speak, proved 
possible, if not without difficulty. However, a traditional market in 
transmission-the operation of the big wires--eluded even theoretical 
designs. Transmission had to be an integrated whole and yet the counter-
market opportunities remained after unbundling. To confront these 
opportunities, FERC looked to a structure that had been developed by 
members of the industry itself. It encouraged reorganization in which bulk 
transmission would be managed by not-for-profit organizations called 
independent systems operators (ISOs ). 15 
Europeans must be immediately alerted to the fact that ISO organization 
as used in the United States is almost the exact opposite from the 
independent system operator option offered as an alternative by the EU 
Commission. The U.S. version of ISO is a not-for-profit system manager 
but the EU uses the term to designate an ordinary business entity: 
This option, a derogation from the basic ownership unbundling approach, is 
know as the "Independent System Operator." This option enables vertically 
integrated companies to retain the ownership of their network assets, but 
requires that the transmission network itself is managed by an independent 
system operator-an undertaking or entity separate from the vertically 
integrated company-that performs all the functions of a network operator. 
In addition, to ensure that the operator remains and acts truly independently 
of the vertically integrated comiany, regulation and permanent regulatory 
monitoring must be put in place. 1 
Thus, the EU version of the ISO does not differ from the "preferred" 
version, except in the ISO alternative the ownership remains with the utility 
and in the preferred version the ownership is separated-but not by much. 
Neither alternative matches the U.S. ISO concept in which the focus is not 
on ownership but on management by an entity governed by all the 
stakeholders and hence truly independent. 
This management organization of the big wires was in some sense 
privileged by FERC's open-access structure. Furthermore, embedded in 
the FERC open-access options was a move toward regional (multistate) 
design. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), already existing in 
many regions, preside over an entity whose function was divided 
geographically according to the most efficient and effective physical and 
economic organization. In the original Power Act, Congress carved out, 
15. For a history of U.S. electricity restructuring, see RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER Loss: 
THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY 
SYSTEM ( 1999). 
16. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
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largely for political reasons, a role for state regulators. 17 It became 
established doctrine that states were given jurisdiction to regulate "retail" 
and the federal regulators retained power over "wholesale."18 Order 888 
envisioned a structure in which federal regulation would impose optimum 
markets with necessarily softened state-defined industry components. In 
New York v. FERC, the Supreme Court strongly affirmed the FERC 
approach. 19 
B. The ISO/RTO Solution 
FERC made a very wise choice: it encouraged the industry itself to offer 
open-access designs that eliminated anticompetitive control from a central 
entity. Almost a natural consequence of unbundling was industry shift to 
ISO/RTO models.20 This organizational model, which had emerged over 
sixty years, manages the big wires and usually makes a market in 
electricity, unencumbered by state or, in some cases, national boundaries. 
It also provides auxiliary services, control of which also presents the 
potential for anticompetitive conduct. In North America, ISOs and RTOs 
represent 67% of electricity customers in the United States and over half of 
those in Canada. 21 
This Article centers on the ISO/RTO model. The model's chart is 
available on the ISO/RTO Council's website.22 The discussion below 
generally equates interconnection among U.S. states with that among EU 
Member States. As can be seen from this chart, however, to be discussed 
further below, there is considerable cross-border cooperation between ISOs 
17. See Rhode Island Pub. Uti!. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 275 U.S. 83 
(1927) (holding that the states could not regulate industries in interstate commerce and 
hence, for the states to have jurisdiction, the power had to be delegated by the federal 
government). 
18. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271,276 (1976) ("The prohibition 
against discriminatory or preferential rates or services imposed by § 205(b) and the 
Commission's power to set just and reasonable rates under [FPA §] 206(a) are accordingly 
limited to sales 'subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,' that is, to sales of electric 
energy at wholesale. The Commission has no power to prescribe the rate for retail sales of 
power companies."). 
19. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. I (2002). Indeed, Justice Thomas, in a separate 
opinion, found that FERC had jurisdiction over transmission transactions including those 
taking place within a state. See id. at 42 (Thomas, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("Finally, to the extent that FERC has concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over 
transmission connected to bundled retail sales, it ignores the clear statutory mandate."). 
20. 18 C.F.R. § 35.34 (2006) (setting out FERC's technical requirements). 
21. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, HARNESSING THE POWER OF DEMAND: How lSOs AND RTOS 
ARE INTEGRATING DEMAND RESPONSE INTO WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2007), 
http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/% 7B584E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD% 70/IRC 
_D R_Report_l 0 1607. pdf. 
22. ISO/RTO Operating Regions, 
http://www. isorto.org/site/c.jhKQ IZPBimE/b.26044 71 /k.B 14 E/Map.htm. 
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in Canada and the United States. The organizational union often operates 
as if it were one entity. Thus, the organizational structure transcends 
political borders and may be seen as operating across international as well 
as interstate borders. The freer from political constraints in general, the 
more likely the boundaries will be determined by physical and market 
efficiencies. But, relevant to this paper, the greater the variety of private 
and governmental stakeholders brought into these entities, the greater the 
challenge to their governance organization. 
C. Collaborative Governance Model in Electricity 
Participatory governance is essential to the comfort level of finns that 
cede some control to an independent authority. For this reason, ISO/RTO 
governance enhances industry participation in joint action to facilitate 
efficient markets and reliability. Equally important, however, is that 
ISO/RTOs provide direct participation by nonindustry stakeholders, 
including consumers and various governments. The ISO/RTO model's 
inclusiveness and transparency gives it legitimacy. The collaborative-
governance strategy of the ISO/RTO system, then, is a key to its success. 
Collaborative governance seeks to reorient tile conceptualization of 
administrative process around techniques of joint problem solving and 
controlled discretion.23 It seeks an alternative to adversarial government 
and explores concepts and processes which might replace interest-group 
contests with cooperation and dialogue?4 It fosters the development of a 
coherent theoretic framework for those experimenting with alternatives 
based on positive problem solving rather than contestibility and coercion. 
It engenders information sharing, accountability, and broad participation 
and deliberation.25 It enables evolutionary decisionrnaking in which 
solutions to immediate problems do not foreclose rethinking of both 
solutions and goals. It envisions synergistic government and broadens 
potential roles of public agencies, such as serving as facilitators and 
23. Collaborative governance is characterized by five features: problem-solving 
orientation; participation by interested and affected persons at all stages of the 
decisionmaking process; solutions that are provisional and subject to revision; 
accountability; and flexible, engaged government institutions. Freeman, supra note I, at 22. 
24. Americans, not just their lawyers, have a great deal of difficulty with such 
behavioral norms. Much of the rest of the world finds it easier to engage in community 
dispute resolution. Our instinctive competitiveness is our strength and our weakness. Here, 
as perhaps elsewhere, this instinct can inhibit the attainment of the ultimate goal. Our 
inability to engage in cooperative decisionmaking may accrue to our comparative 
disadvantage in the increasingly interconnected world. 
25. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 N.W. U.L. REv. 173 (1997) (explaining that, while 
U.S. administrative law exults participation, the central consideration must be optimizing 
deliberation). 
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information clearinghouses. Yet, while government may guide and 
monitor performance, it does not dictate operations. As Professor Freeman 
observed, "A collaborative perspective requires that we reconceive the 
relationship and responsibilities among public and private actors in the 
regulatory process."26 For these reasons, it seems to speak directly to the 
evolving electricity industry. 
Through the ISO/RTO model, the collaborative-governance package has 
transformed governance in the electricity industry. Careful attention to the 
instrumental value of participation as well as its normative value is 
nowhere more important that in electricity governance. Indeed, 
collaborative problem solving changes the conceptualization of the 
interaction among the interests. Electricity governance is a complex 
prisoner's dilemma in which individual self-interest may in fact diminish 
the payoff for everyone, unlike most business relationships in which 
competition has social value. Mutual trust is obviously not enough and 
hence positive governance is necessary. The governance structure must be 
effective and fair-and appear to be effective and fair. Tile ISO/R TO 
model then serves the complex problem-solving challenges of the 
electricity industry. At the same time, it satisfies all the various interests in 
which they are involved in substance as well as form. 
The oldest RTO, PJM, may well serve as an exemplar.27 This RTO 
originally managed grids in the neighboring U.S. states of Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and Maryland; hence its name. PJM was started by electric 
utilities in 1927 and became the first PERC-certified R TO in 1997. It has 
been extremely successful, growing to include 450 members in 15 Mid-
Atlantic states. It manages over 56,000 miles of transmission lines and 
164,905 MW of generation. PJM covers 1,271 generating sources and 
serves over 51 million customers. Thus, it fosters vibrant competition 
between producers and provides choices for customers and marketers. 
In the P JM governance system, the central authority is the Board of 
Managers. The Board is charged with operating a fair, nondiscriminatory 
electricity market. The Board may have no person who has a personal 
affiliation or ongoing professional relationship or financial stake in any 
PJM market participant. A Members Committee provides advice to the 
Board. That Committee has representatives from the key segments: 
generators, transmission owners, distributors, marketers, and consumers. A 
Nominating Committee fills vacancies on the Board. Various specialized 
committees, such as the Reliability Committee or the Finance Committee, 
26. Freeman, supra note I, at 97. 
27. A great deal of information about the issues discussed here and otherwise is 
available on the PJM website, http://www.pjm.com. 
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work to refine and improve rules, policies, and processes. Input also comes 
from user groups. 
ISO/RTOs such as PJM engage in self-regulation of their various 
members. PJM's Market Monitoring Unit guards against the exercise of 
market power by any market member. The industry itself developed this 
concept to engender trust among market participants, including 
competitors. The Unit analyzes market data and takes action to make 
structural or rule changes. Self-regulation has been very successful in 
several U.S. industries, such as the securities industry. Members of the 
industry itself are much harder to fool than government regulators. On the 
other hand, they are sensitive to the needs of industry participants. When 
self-regulation works, it is both more effective and less burdensome to the 
industry. An independent transmission organization responsible for the 
industry's integrity offers the most effective monitor. For one thing, self-
monitoring creates legitimacy in that part of the industry that cannot be 
protected by market forces. In the end, the industry benefits from keeping 
its own house clean rather than dealing with intrusive governmental 
interference. 
Another advantage of independent transmission management is its 
dispute-resolution machinery. Any environment with so many actors will 
create numerous disputes. For example, sometimes generators are unable 
to meet their delivery promise, customers may not want the delivery, or 
repairs may be negligent or slow. An effective transmission manager must 
efficiently settle such disputes. An ISO/RTO has the status, resources, and 
independence to do so. It is a better alternative to govenunent regulatory 
mechanisms or judicial dispute-resolution mechanisms. 
In sum, the private government-like services-including management, 
rulemaking, enforcement, and dispute settlement-solve many of the 
governmental tasks without many of the disadvantages of direct 
governmental involvement. Such entities serve well the sophisticated and 
complex tasks involved in governing the core segment of the electricity 
industry, bulk transmission. Fairness, competence, efficiency, and 
legitimacy radiate out to the entire industry and ultimately to the society it 
serves. 
IV. EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS 
The EU has confronted electricity restructuring at three levels: treaty 
revision, statute-like measures, and pan-European and Member State 
administrative implementation. A brief summary of EU developments is 
necessary here. 28 
28. For a brief overview of EU law and government, see CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 
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A. Treaty Recognition of Energy 
The basic or "constitutional" documents of the EU have been created by 
the various treaties signed by European nations admitted into the Union 
(Member States). These operative treaties have been consolidated into one 
unified document,29 which combines two treaties: the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty) and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community (TEC). 3° From time to time, an 
Intergovernmental Conference is convened to develop amendments to the 
treaties. The most recent conference adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, or 
"constitution lite," which will impose more explicit energy responsibilities 
on the EU institutions. 
In a sense, energy drove the progenitors of the European Union. The 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 first brought 
together the founding nations and created the prototype of pan-European 
government. In 1957, as they formed the European Economic Community 
(ECC), they also established a community more directly focused on energy: 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Still, it was not 
until the 1992 Maastrich Treaty that the Member States identified energy as 
a major EU concern. Energy has become one of the most pressing 
problems confronting the European Union (and the world). 
The Treaty of Lisbon/1 signed by the heads of EU Member States on 
December 13, 2007, raised the status of energy in general perhaps to the 
level of the original four freedoms. 32 The Treaty of Lisbon will add a new 
Title XX. This title for now will add an Article 176A to the consolidated 
treaty. Article l76A expresses, among other things, a commitment to pan-
European electricity industry. In paragraph 1 it states that EU energy 
policy would be built around a "spirit of solidarity between Member 
States." In particular, subparagraph l(d) provides that that policy shall 
"promote the interconnection of energy networks." According to 
paragraph 2, these objectives are generally to be accomplished through the 
PRIMER FOR U.S. LAWYERS ON EUROPEAN UNION GOVERNMENT AND LAW (2008), 
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/euljan2008primerversionkoch.pdf. 
29. Basic treaties: Go to http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm, then select 
"European Union-Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community." (Both the "Treaty on European Union" 
(TEU) & "Treaty Establishing the European Community" (TEC)). 
30. When the Lisbon treaty comes into force the TEC will become the "Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union," http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm. A new 
consolidated version of the Treaty will be created. 
31. http://europa.eu/lisbon_treatylindex_en.htm. 
32. The core of EU substantive law has developed from the "four freedoms": the free 
movement of goods, workers, capital, and the freedom of establishment and service. The 
law for each has evolved somewhat differently through legislation and judicial 
interpretation. 
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"ordinary legislative procedure," formerly "co-decision."33 Under the 
ordinary legislative procedure, legislative measures are adopted by a 
"qualified majority" or weighted majority of the representatives of the 
Member States under amended Article 251; hence an individual Member 
State may not "veto" most energy legislation?4 
B. Legislative Development Toward a "Third Legislative Package" 
Although establishing clear responsibility and competence, the Treaty of 
Lisbon amendments provide only a framework. Thus, it is the legislative 
process which will restructure the European electricity industry.35 In 2007, 
33. Currently, TEC Article 249 establishes three types of legislation: "regulation," 
"directive," and "decision." Regulations are binding without further Member State action. 
Directives require further action. Decisions are only binding on those to whom they are 
addressed. Article 251 establishes a complex procedure for enacting legislation in which the 
Commission, Council, and European Parliament participate. This process will be changed 
little when the Lisbon Treaty is ratified. 
34. It is only for fiscal policy, under paragraph 3, that a unanimous vote of the 
Members States is required. 
35. For those unfamiliar with EU governance, a few words about the EU institutions 
brought to bear on the electricity industry will be necessary. The EU has five key 
institutions: the European Council, the Council of the European Union (Council), European 
Parliament (Parliament), European Commission (Commission), and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). 
The European Council, distinct from the Council of the European Union, is made 
up of the ministers of the Member States, the Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States and the President of the Commission, assisted by the ministers for Foreign Affairs 
and a Member of the Commission. TEU Article 4 provides, "The European Council shall 
provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the 
general political guidelines thereof." Thus, it is directly involved in developing the energy 
agenda. 
The Council exercises the legislative authority with parliament. Each Member State 
(there are currently twenty-seven) is represented on the Council by a minister, depending on 
the subject matter under consideration, who is authorized to commit their government. In 
fact, the Council, although nominally a single entity, assembles in one of nine 
configurations, one of which is Transportation, Telecommunication & Energy (TTE). Joint 
action is taken by a vote of the representatives of the Member States. On energy matters, the 
Council votes will be weighed in rough approximation of the state's population, known as a 
"qualified majority." All the work of this Council is prepared or coordinated by the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). 
The Parliament has joint legislative power with the Council. The Members of the 
European Parliament (MEP) are the only directly elected EU officials. It has a committee 
for "Industry, Research and Energy." 
The Commission is the hub of the EU, having significant equivalent powers along 
with most of the administrative responsibilities. The Commission is an active participant in 
the legislative process and provides the bureaucracy that implements EU policies. The 
College of Commissioners are nominated by the Member States and are often assigned 
according to their expertise and/or the Member States' special interest in a subject area. The 
Commission is divided into departments known as Directorates General, which are 
responsible for a specific policy area and are headed by a Director General. The Energy 
commissioner may have direct responsibility for electricity, but competition, environment, 
consumer protection, and internal market are also involved in the development of energy 
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the Commission sent forward its "third legislative package," dealing with 
electricity and natural gas.36 As the name suggests, these reports and 
recommendations are the most recent iteration of the long electricity 
restructuring process. They provide evidence that an internal market in 
electricity is still very much a work in progress. 
1. Initial Legislative Stages 
The process began before the first legislation, the "First Electricity 
Directive."37 Development is said to have begun with a Commission paper, 
"The Internal Energy Market" in 1988. The paper described a competitive 
market in all the energy markets, including electricity. It helped begin an 
"internal" pan-European market in energy. Parliament and the Council 
adopted various energy directives. Two of these dealt with electricity. The 
June 29, 1990 Directive 90/377/EEC sought to make the electricity market 
more transparent, and the October 29, 1990 Directive 90/547/EEC focused 
on the grid. 38 
The so-called First Electricity Directive, Directive 96/92/EC of 
December 19, 1996, was the first significant step toward an internal 
electricity market.39 This Directive attempted to deal with the various 
complexities of restructuring the European electricity industry. The 
directive left a good deal of the liberalization to the Member States. As in 
the United States, this directive, for both legal and practical reasons, opted 
for "functional unbundling."40 That is, vertically integrated firms were 
required to separate their network operations from their other activities. 
The directive, as in the United States, recognized the limitations on the 
natural monopoly model. The Member States could choose to organize the 
policy. 
EU judicial authority is vested in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), assisted by 
the Court of First Instances. The ECJ has yet to take a substantial role in the development of 
energy policy. However, it has been a very active court and it can be expected to be 
increasingly involved as the other EU and Member State institutions focus attention of such 
matters. 
36. ELECTRICITY GREEN PAPER, supra note 2. 
37. For a more complete description of the evolution ofEU energy policy see Danwitz, 
supra note 4, 433-40. 
38. Americans should note that transparency connotes for Europeans a much broader 
set of values than for Americans. For Americans, transparency is virtually synonymous with 
openness. For Europeans, transparency includes not only openness, but also public 
sensitivity, participation, and good administration in general. 
39. Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 December 
1996 concerning common rules for the internal market OJ L027 (30/01/1997) (hereinafter 
96 Directive). 
40. In addition to the impossible political obstacles as in the U.S., divestiture may 
violate European human rights jurisprudence. See Danwitz, supra note 4, at 436-37. Some 
Member State courts may find that ownership unbundling violates property rights 
guaranteed by the national constitution. 
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operating system either by negotiated supply contract (a regulated system 
in which access was based on published tariffs), or by a "single buyer" 
procedure in which the Member State designated an entity to be responsible 
for transmission management with a territory. The Member States could 
continue the "public service" principle, in which the company received 
protection from competition in exchange for an obligation to satisfy certain 
public service standards. However, this concept is in direct tension with a 
free internal market in electricity because it burdens the internal market 
with public-interest responsibilities.41 
The Second Electricity Directive, Directive 2003/54/EC, repealed the 
First Directive.42 This Second Directive was based on the concept of 
electricity as a service and hence accepted limitations on competition. Still, 
it was intended to end distortions of competition caused by differences in 
Member State regulation. Most significant is the choice between 
"negotiated" access under the First Directive and regulated network 
access.43 Under the latter approach, the European regime accommodated a 
wide variety of different regulatory models. Danwitz offers three 
criticisms: 
First, [the directive permits a] wide variety of obligations which member 
states can impose upon companies under their authority to regulate in the 
general economic interest. 
[T]he Second Directive does not give member states any guidelines for 
how to ensure that companies active in the energy markets will be kept 
financially capable of providing services of general interest. Finally, 
member states can decide not to apply fundamental provisions of the 
Directive.44 
The directive also promotes renewables to address the climate-protection 
concern. 
Both the first and second package established the Transmission System 
Operator (TSO) as the core of the bulk power transmission. The 1996 
Directive found that, 
[w]hereas each transmission system must be subject to central management 
and control in order to ensure the security, reliability and efficiency of the 
system in the interests of producers and their customers; whereas a 
transmission system operator should therefore be designated and entrusted 
41. See generally Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve" and Protection of 
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REv. 
1233 (1998). 
42. Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
96/92/92 (hereinafter Second Directive). 
43. Germany is an example of the failures of negotiated approach. See Danwitz, supra 
note 4, at 445-49. 
44. !d. at 443. 
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with the operation, maintenance, and, if necessary, development of the 
system; whereas the transmission system operator must behave in an 
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.45 
It provides that 
Member States shall designate or shall require undertakings which own 
transmission systems to designate ... , a system operator to be responsible 
for operating, ensuring the maintenance of, and, if necessary, developing the 
transmission system in a given area and its interconnectors with other 
. d . f 1 46 systems, m or er to guarantee secunty o supp y. 
The EU has been committed to this path ever since. 
The 1996 directive also required the creation of retail transmtsswn 
entities called distribution system operators (DSOs).47 These entities form 
the delivery leg of the complete EU transmission system design, 
marketing/distribution. Obviously, DSO operations are part of a complete 
view of the European electricity system but their operation and 
organization are beyond the scope of this paper. 
2. The Third Package 
In 2007, the Commission submitted its third legislative package, 
proposing amendments to the 2003 legislation. The process toward the 
third package can be said to begin when the Commission published a 
March 8, 2005 "Green Paper" on developing a common, coherent 
European energy policy in response to a direction from the European 
Council. 48 (The Commission engages its own and outside experts to study 
an issue and often develops a Green Paper-a document intended to begin 
discussion-particularly within the EU institutions.)49 
The legislative proposals attempt to correct defects in the regime brought 
about by the existing legislation. Unfortunately, choices made in the prior 
legislation make solutions more difficult. The choice of command-and-
control regulation naturally results in even more intrusive and market-
distorting government intervention, as it did in the United States. The 
collaborative governance model offers another way. It offers an alternative 
that can and should be instituted by the European industry as it has been in 
the United States. Again, as in the United States, regulators should 
encourage their formation and then monitor their performance without 
injecting themselves directly into operations. 
45. 96 Directive, supra note 39, at 0025. 
46. /d. at Article 7(1). 
47. /d. at Article 10(2). 
48. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 2, at 105. 
49. A "White Paper" contains a proposal for specific action. White papers may but do 
not necessarily follow a Green Paper. 
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C. Implementing Measures the EU Way 
The European industry is politically and, in general, technically 
fragmented into twenty-seven national industries. 50 The legislative 
packages envision implementing measures at the pan-European and 
Member State levels? Unlike in the United States, the EU delegates most 
pan-European implementing authority to the Member States.52 This 
"constitutional" choice fundamentally distinguishes the EU "federalism" 
from U.S. federalism. 53 The European system relies on the Member State 
legislatures and executive officials to implement EU law and hence results 
in a quite different configuration of the European administrative system. 54 
This basic distinction must be factored into the multistate aspects of the 
model advocated here but not the not-for-profit aspects. 
Despite the utilization of Member State administrations, EU law is 
50. For a discussion of each national segment, see Commission Staff Working 
Document Accompanying Document to the Communication for the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market, 
SEC (2006) 1707 (10.1.2007). See, e.g., id. at 62 ("The opening of the [electricity] market 
is still primarily theoretical in France."). 
51. Agency categories recognize a coordination between national governmental 
institutions and European institutions. Mario Chiti, The Emergence of a Community 
Administration: the Case of European Agencies, 37 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 309 (2000). 
National agencies (which European scholars tend to lump together as "national regulatory 
agencies" or "NRAs") perform much of the European administrative functions. A growing 
number of EU agencies (European agencies or EAs) have taken on some of the 
administrative responsibility but even so they tend to coordinate with NRAs. 
52. As in the United States, delegation is the fundamental issue. Theoretically, 
delegation of basic policymaking authority is prohibited. Meroni v. High Authority, [1958] 
ECR II (1957-1958)] & [1958] ECR 53 (1958). See Jens-Peter Schneider, A Common 
Framework for Decentralized EU Agencies and the Meroni Doctrine, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 
(SPECIAL EDITION) 29 (2009). In the United States, practicality has forced acceptance of the 
exercise of broad delegations. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 371, 372 (1989) 
("Applying the 'intelligible principle' test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence 
has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, 
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."). EU Jaw has been going 
through a similar evolution. Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Devolution of Implementing 
Policymaking in Network Governments, 57 EMORY L.J. 167 (2007). To keep the theory alive 
but capture the reality, the Treaty of Lisbon will distinguish legislative actions from "non-
legislative acts" or delegated implementing policymaking. See new Article 249B ("A 
legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of 
general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative 
act."). 
53. Europeans should note that the U.S. Supreme Court has absolutely prohibited the 
"commandeering" of state and local legislative and executive branches. New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), invalidated federal efforts to direct state legislatures (even 
though the states asked for it), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), invalidated 
federal efforts to command state and local executive officials. 
54. See generally Paul Craig, Shared Administration, Disbursement of Community 
Funds and the Regulatory State, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
(Herwig C.H. Hofinann, ed.) (forthcoming June 2009). 
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supreme when exercised.55 To date, however, the Council and European 
Parliament have not chosen to co-opt the Member State electricity 
authorities. Indeed, EU legislative efforts have forced regulatory bodies 
onto the Member States. 56 Thus, the European Union is actually imposing 
the regulatory fragmentation that the United States is fighting to soften. 
Existing and proposed legislative strategies do little more than authorize 
cooperation among the Member State regulatory bodies. The Commission 
has proposed no more than an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators. The Internal Market Proposal observes that, 
[i]n practice, only a body emanating from the national regulators can catalyse 
all the necessary resources of national regulators that is [sic] fundamental to 
achieving success on these issues. The Commission is not in that position. 
The Commission has concluded that the tasks required could be best 
fulfilled by a separate entity, independent and outside the Commission. Both 
the European Council ... as well as recent European Parliament resolutions, 
endorse this conclusion. 57 
Hence, a FERC-like agency does not seem in the immediate future of the 
pan-European electricity industry. However, the European Union may 
ultimately move toward a more intrusive European-wide energy 
regulator. 58 At present, eliminating geographic fragmentation must be the 
work of the industry itself, as in the United States not so long ago. The 
ISO/RTO model offers the device for doing so. 
V. BEYOND THE THIRD PACKAGE 
Those who have been involved with the U.S. electricity industry since 
before restructuring would say that the European Union is trying to do it 
the hard way. We say so confidently because the United States was stuck 
in the same box for generations. The EU vision is at base federalized 
command-and-control regulation. This vision is the one the United States 
is trying to escape. The way out for the United States has been a shift to 
employing truly independent transmission-management bodies, which are 
governed in such as way as to force sensitivity to the interests of all the 
55. Although there is no EU supremacy clause, the European Court of Justice early on 
in Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L 'Engergia Elettrica (ENEL) firmly established that 
principle and has not been seriously challenged [1964] ECR 1141. 
56. Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
96/92/EC, Article 23; Regulation (EC) No. 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity. See Note ofDG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 
2003/55/EC on the Internal Market in Electricity and Natural Gas, "The Role of the 
Regulatory Authorities." (14/112004). 
57. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 2, at 10. 
58. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 2, at 6. 
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stakeholders. The various levels of regulators then become the monitors 
and ultimate guarantors of the public regarding performance. This 
approach would better answer the goals identified in the Commission's 
third-package proposals. 
A. Escaping the Command-and-Control Box 
The United States has eased out of the command-and-control box by 
encouraging the industry to form itself around independent, not-for-profit 
managers of the bulk transmission segment, the ISO/RTO model. The U.S. 
industry itself in many regions was already moving to this basic 
organization. Increasingly the industry depended on multistate, not-for-
profit systems operators to provide market mechanisms while maintaining 
the optimum transmission performance. This structure was attractive to 
industry because it enabled competitors and stakeholders to work in concert 
in their mutual interest. 
In 1996, the federal government approach shift from adversarial 
industry/government scheme to command and control began with the 
foundational open-access regulation, Order 888.59 That first step 
recognized the public-interest advantages of collaborative governance in 
the move to "unbundling." Unlike the EU Commission, FERC abandoned 
reform strategies based on tightening command-and-control regulation. It 
charged the industry with the task of working out a viable restructuring 
plan which captured the efficiencies from coordination but structurally 
mitigated opportunities for collusion and discrimination. In terms of 
organization, FERC suggested only that it would look favorably on the 
ISO/RTO solution. In Order 2000, it established a template for RTOs but it 
still left to the industry the choice as to how structurally to accomplish the 
unbundling and open-access goals.60 The ISO/RTO solution increasingly 
recommended itself to the industry as well as the regulators. 
Several approaches were tried, including a separate for-profit 
transmission operator, like the EU version of the independent systems 
operator. Many practical difficulties doomed this alternative. From a 
regulatory perspective, both FERC and the public doubted that these 
bottleneck, for-profit transmission operators would avoid conflicts of 
59. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities 
and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May I 0, 1996) (hereinafter Order 888). 
60. The main framework for the development of transmission organizations and hence 
particularly relevant to this paper was provided by Order 2000, Regional Transmission 
Organizations, 65 FED. REG. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (hereinafter Order 2000). In that order, 
FERC established twelve characteristics and functions that an entity must satisfy in order to 
become an RTO. 
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interests. Simply put, it seemed inevitable that the traditional business 
organization and the profit motive would ultimately drive these firms 
toward self-interested conduct. 
The EU Commission increasingly commits to a regulatory, command-
and-control strategy. The proposals in the third package call for stronger 
and more intrusive Member State National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs). 
The "federal" aspect of the industry was confronted through cooperation 
among these agencies.61 It continues the trend to an ever larger role for a 
pan-European agency but still not a pan-European electricity system.62 As 
was true in the United States, by relying on an adversarial governmental 
scheme, the EU motivates the industry to act adversarially. The regulatory 
fragmentation is perpetuated because a pan-European agency seems to face 
significant, if not impossible, political obstacles.63 The message from the 
United States is that this strategy is not in the rational best interest of the 
industry and the consuming public, although it might serve that of the 
bureaucrats. 
Rather than depending on a pan-European regulator or further 
empowering the Member State regulatory bodies, the EU authorities might 
consider encouraging the U.S. ISO/RTO model. 64 It is significant that in 
the United States these entities were developed by the industry itself. After 
generations of command-and-control schemes, FERC undertook in essence 
a partnership with these private governmental bodies. This shift in 
emphasis mitigates to a large extent a number of adversarial relationships 
inherent in the command-and-control regime: that between government and 
the industry; that between the industry and its customers; and that between 
industry members of various size and functions. In contrast, the path taken 
by the European Union pits the most dominant members of the industry 
against consumers of all varieties-competitors as well as governments. 
Customers in the EU scheme are left outside and hence can be expected to 
act as adversaries. After the unbundling, the generation and 
retail/distribution segments also must assume an adversarial relationship 
with the transmission segment. The collaborative governance organization 
created by the ISO/RTO model tempers these adversarial tendencies. 
EU legislation does not seem to preclude not-for-profit TSOs but simply 
ignores that option. 65 As noted above, the EU institutions, on the 
61. Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 8. 
62. See id. (listing regulatory powers). 
63. Some evidence for this observation is the reaction to the proposal by telecom 
commissioner Viviane Reding for a pan-European agency for that industry. Sarah Laitner, 
Blow to Plan for Telecoms "Super" Regulator, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008. 
64. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 8. 
65. See Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 5N6 (discussing only the "two 
options"). 
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recommendation of the Commission, have consistently centered European 
restructuring on Member State-oriented transmission-system operators 
(TSOs) as a for-profit business. U.S. open-access regulation leaves open 
the option of for-profit transmission organizations (broadly known as 
"transcos"), but those do not seem to survive. Perhaps destructive pressure 
comes from the fact that the other stakeholders and regulators distrust these 
business-motivated bottleneck entities. Indeed, it seems that even the 
participating competitors reach a level of dysfunctional distrust that 
ultimately ends each such endeavor. The U.S. experience may suggest that 
closed, for-profit bulktransmission entities present negative incentives that 
are hard to monitor through direct government regulation. Thus, this 
option is in direct conflict with a system that is trying to downsize its 
command-and-control approach. 
The third package continues to center on the TSOs and that structure 
could be the beginning of a viable solution. Unfortunately, the European 
Union apparently assumes and accepts, as for years did the United States, 
that these entities would be organized and governed as any other business. 66 
The Commission proposal requires only that the TSO "consult" with 
stakeholders.67 On the other hand, in classic collaborative governance 
fashion, the ISO/RTO model brings all the stakeholders into the actual 
decisionmaking process, as can be seen in the discussion of PJM above. It 
is little wonder that this model has expanded so rapidly, serving 67% of the 
U.S. consumers and half of those in Canada. With those affected by the 
management of the big wires directly involved in their management, there 
is much more trust, and enhanced efficiencies result from the softening of 
adversarial relationships and the diminished need for direct command-and-
control regulation. Again, the EU legislation may not preclude 
stakeholder-governed bulk transmission entities, but it also does not 
facilitate them. It should. More realistically, since government bodies 
hanker after the power inherent in direct regulation, the industry itself 
should develop and lobby for this option. 
Replacing direct government regulation with the collaborative ISO/RTO 
model also tends to foster reliance on objective, expert decisionmaking. A 
decision must have sound technical support because all the stakeholders 
have to buy into the decision. Advocacy and power become less important. 
Decisions are more likely motivated by what is best for the system, and 
hence society, rather than what is best for an individual business entity. 
66. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 5-6. 
67. See Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 15 ("[S]takeholders will be consulted 
on any draft market and technical code prepared by the transmission system operators and 
they will be able to comment on the annual work programme of the transmission system 
operators." (emphases added)). 
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Hence a look at the organization of the U.S. ISO/RTOs will discover a 
myriad of broadly representative study groups and expert task forces. 
B. Fair and Transparent Pricing 
As stated above, electricity has been considered a "natural monopoly." 
As such, the efficient organization would be one dominated by a single 
firm with "market" pricing artificially imposed by government. Thus, in 
the United States, the federal agency was required to assure that rates were 
"just and reasonable" at the wholesale level and the state regulators did the 
same at the state level. 68 The present EU approach does not so empower a 
"federal" agency but delegates responsibility to the Member States. 
Member States engage in rate regulation.69 
Regulating rates-setting nonmarket prices-has always been 
complex.70 By the end of the 20th century, energy policymakers in the 
United States, both legislative and administrative, had determined that the 
social costs of rate-making exceeded its social benefits. Since then, 
policymakers have attempted to move toward market-driven pricing. The 
ISO/RTO model has been instrumental in implementing market pricing in 
the complex electricity market. FERC has encouraged the voluntary 
participation in ISO/RTO by allowing those firms to rely on the tariff filing 
of the ISO/RT0.71 In Order 888, FERC offered a "pro-forma" open-access 
tariff whereby transmission providers could comply with their new market-
related obligations. The ISO/RTO form is encouraged in order to make it 
easier to administer and enforce these obligations. Even though the states 
continued to regulate retail prices, the ISO/RTO system promotes uniform, 
market-driven prices for bulk-transmission access. 
Europe has an advantage in that, at this point, it will not need to wean 
itself away from a pan-European price regulator. Fortunately, its reform 
efforts do not seem to envision such rate regulation. The third package, 
and throughout the evolution of EU restructuring, focuses almost no 
attention on pricing. Nonetheless, as bulk transmission escapes Member 
State borders, pricing must also become a pan-European interest. The 
68. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276 (1976) (explaining 
that the Federal Power Act provides that the federal agency regulates wholesale and the 
states regulate retail). 
69. Commission Staff Working Document accompanying document to the 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market COM (2006) 841 (covering all the 
Member States but Bulgaria and Romania). 
70. See, e.g., ESSAYS ON PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND REGULATION (Harry M. Trebing 
ed., 1971). 
71. On February 16, 2007, the Commission issued Order 890 adopting certain refores 
of the pro forma tariff. 
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fragmented regulation, in fact required by EU legislation, means that pan-
European transmission must contend with various pricing schemes. Thus, 
the Commission's approach to pan-European regulation seems the worst of 
both worlds. Wholesale power will not be subject to European pricing 
regulation, in contrast to the United States, but will be subject to Member 
State rate regulation. For one thing, this fragmented price regulation means 
that it will be much harder to dismantle bulk-transmission pricing schemes 
defined by political rather than economic borders. 
The elimination of retail price regulation is a more complex question not 
apparently solved through the ISO/RTO model. Simply put, small business 
and individual consumers do not seem to take advantage of market 
opportumtles. Even though the ISO/RTO model includes consumer 
representatives, it has not been successful in this regard. It probably is not 
sufficiently sensitive to the weakness of· small industry and residential 
representation.72 Even if such a governance breakthrough could be 
achieved, however, these consumers will likely continue to behave in the 
market as they did under the integrated utility regime. Indeed, what 
economists call "search costs" might make it irrational for them to behave 
otherwise. Their welfare concerns are aggravated by the wholesale-retail 
price squeeze. 73 Pricing throughout the network dictates retail pricing. If 
care is not taken with network pricing, small business and residential 
consumers are merely stuck between noncompetitive costs and competitive 
or regulated prices. Retail marketers who potentially could make markets 
for such consumers are powerless against this market- structure dilemma. 
In short, U.S. states continue to engage in retail price setting, and it is hard 
to argue against their doing so even though such price regulation artificially 
fragments the market. A multistate solution would be preferable but does 
not seem imminent. 
Realization of a true pan-European internal market faces the same 
"street-level" obstacles. The EU Commission might have hoped that the 
DSOs would facilitate a viable retail market. Yet as the internal market 
proposals found, "Neither in the electricity and the gas market is it yet 
possible to speak of a European retail market (household and small 
enterprise), as customers, assuming they have a choice, are still obliged to 
72. For further discussion of this problem in the United States, see Charles H. Koch, 
Jr., Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
REv. 589, 602-604 (2005) ("Fair RTO governance ... must assure that the small consumers 
[small business and residential consumers] are not submerged within a universal 'consumer' 
interest as defined by large industrial and commercial consumers."). 
73. See Greg Goelzhauser, Price Squeeze in a Deregulated Electricity Power Industry, 
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 225, 241 (2004) ("Although electric power firms' rates are regulated 
to some extent, a squeeze may arise due to actions of the differing bodies that set or approve 
the rates: FERC at wholesale and state regulatory commissions at retail."). 
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choose a supplier established in the same country."74 The third package 
does attempt to confront the problems of the retail market, but the 
Commission presentation can only be termed pessimistic. 
Both systems then may have no alternative but to accept retail-price 
regulation. True to the theme of this piece, it may be that the collaborative 
governance of the ISO/RTO can be designed to offer a non-governmental 
remedy. It cannot at this point be said that it has succeeded in doing so. 
While it might seem that European and American consumers are different, 
they may be similar enough to make a transatlantic dialogue on this 
conundrum valuable to both. 
C. Viable Cross-Border Market 
One aspect to true pan-European competitive pricing is allowing the 
industry to reach its natural physical and market boundaries. Not only must 
former national monopolies not be allowed to discriminate among 
compatriots, but attainment of an internal market requires non-
discrimination within a pan-European industry. Europe is already 
significantly interconnected and those interconnections are increasing. 
This condition parallels that in the United States during the initial stages of 
the open-access project. 
In both the United States and the European Union, as energy needs 
overcome politics, the systems have become increasingly and more 
transparently interconnected. The Union for the Co-ordination of 
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) has created a map showing the 
physical energy flows between European countries, which is available on 
the UCTE website.75 A U.S. Department of Energy study, for example, 
observed "three major interconnected power systems: the Eastern and 
Western Interconnection, and the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas 
(ERCOT) False Today, over 150,000 miles of high-voltage transmission 
lines link generators to load centers through interconnected transmission 
systems that span utility services, territories, states, regions, and the borders 
of Mexico and Canada."76 Similarly, as described below, Europe is 
increasingly interconnected, and the grid naturally divides into multistate 
regions not constrained by political borders. Practical impetus simply rolls 
over these borders in the absence of overwhelming political will. 
Still, the Green Paper observed: "Many markets remain largely national, 
74. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 18. 
75. Final Report, Implementation of TEN-E project (2004--2006): Evaluation and 
Analysis, figure 9, available at 
http://www. ucte.org/_library/statsexchange/e_exchanges_2005. pdf. 
76. U.S. Department of Energy, National Transmission Grid Study, 2-3 (2002), 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/transmission-grid.pdf. 
2009] COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 95 
and dominated by a few companies. Many differences remain between 
Member States' approaches to market opening, preventing the development 
of a truly competitive European market false."77 It asserted that consumers 
"need a single European grid." The Internal Market Proposal suggests a 
"supra-national" transmission operator.78 However, it seems wedded to the 
idea of cooperation among national TSOs rather than actual cross-border 
entities. Among other things, its suggestion comes close but ultimately 
misses the point by confining its thinking to interconnected systems of 
industry participants segmented by national borders. It does not see that 
the inability to think outside this particular box results in an unsatisfactory 
level of interconnection.79 Thus, while its first "concrete proposal" is the 
development of a European Grid, it does not see the overarching 
importance of the governance of that grid in accomplishing that goal.80 
These state-defined systems-even if physically interconnected-cannot 
optimally serve the public interest. All EU institutions nominally support 
transnational interconnects.81 The TEN-E project study shows significant 
advances in cross-border interconnections. 82 These interconnections 
increasingly are aimed at power-market goals between national systems, 
rather than only supplying security.83 The EU recognizes the need for one 
or more grids without political borders. The Commission observed the lack 
of incentive to pursue all feasible and advantageous interconnections;84 it 
hopes that these business entities will cooperate. 85 As Adam Smith 
observed some years ago, business people coming together is never good 
for the rest of us. ISO/RTO enables grid cooperation with much less 
opportunity to jointly act against the public or competitors. Indeed, it 
evolved from business people, both industry members and their customers, 
seeking an cooperative organization they could trust. 
Fragmented regulation is also a major obstacle to an efficiently 
organized internal market. The Internal Market Proposal laments the 
difficult technical problems caused by the various Member State 
regulations.86 In the United States, a national regulator was already in 
77. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 3, at 5. 
78. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 7. 
79. /d. at 6. 
80. !d. at 18. 
81. Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 3. 
82. MVV Consulting, "Final Report: Implementation of TEN-E Project (2004-2006) 
Evaluation and Analysis" (27/7/2006). 
83. Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 19. 
84. !d. at 4. 
85. !d. at 13. 
86. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 10 ("At present the technical rules that 
electricity companies must operate under, 'grid-codes,' differ enormously between Member 
States and often even within a single Member State."). 
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place and it needed only to step back from direct involvement. Thus, 
FERC could both mandate multistate solutions and withdraw command-
and-control regulation in order to foster an industry unconstrained by 
political borders. The industry-driven cross-border uniformity was a 
natural result, and the not-for-profit entity, acting transparently and 
inclusively, prevented collusion and discrimination. In the Green Paper, 
the Commission promised to examine "whether existing forms of 
collaboration between national regulators and national operators are 
adequate, or whether a closer level of collaboration is needed-with for 
example a European energy regulator to look at cross-border issues."87 
The Commission has proposed for an Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators. The lesson from the U.S. experience is that regulatory 
cooperation will not get the job done. 
D. Residual Market Manipulation 
The Commission identifies a persistent problem with functional 
unbundling:88 "Firstly, the transmission system operator may treat its 
affiliated companies better than competing third parties." As the 
Commission further recognized, "This inherent conflict of interest is almost 
impossible to control by regulatory means as the independence of the 
transmission system operator within an integrated company is impossible to 
monitor without an excessively burdensome and intrusive regulation." To 
solve this problem the Commission's "preferred option.. . remains 
ownership unbundling."89 As in the United States, ownership unbundling 
meets strong resistance. Indeed, in some Member States it may be a 
violation of fundamental rights.90 
Evidence from the U.S. experience is that even ownership unbundling 
does not prevent discrimination against "outsiders" or collusion among 
"affiliates." The ISO/RTO model includes "market monitoring" operations. 
This self-regulatory regime is preferable to direct-conduct regulation and 
the threat of direct regulation strengthens the hand of private-market 
87. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 3, at 6. 
88. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 4. 
89. !d. at 5; see also Cross-Border Proposal, supra note 3, at 3-5 (separate shares for 
each entity). 
90. Danwitz, supra note 6, at 436-437: 
As to the forced transfer of ownership to new legal entities: "The expropriation of the 
network operators ... would require considerable restriction on fundamental property 
rights of private companies which are protected both by European Law and by the 
constitutional law of the member states .... " 
As to transfer of control to independent entities, the German Constitutional 
Court has held that option to be de facto expropriations because "the legal position 
would be essentially worthless due to the complete loss of influence on the network." 
2009] COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 97 
monitoring. Indeed, this possibility may be one of the reasons industry 
members voluntarily committed themselves to this regime. More 
importantly, the industry is likely to police itself more efficiently and 
effectively provided it has the incentives to do so. 
Still, it is clear that some government oversight is desirable and 
nonetheless inevitable. ISO/RTO market-monitoring operations offer a 
self-regulatory remedy for discrimination and collusion, but this solution 
has not answered all skeptics. Moreover, a substantial segment of the U.S. 
market is not encompassed in an ISO/RTO model. Congress recognized 
that market manipulation is still a factor in the U.S. electricity industry and 
therefore enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct).91 The EPAct, 
among other things, gave FERC increased authority to issue rules to 
prevent market manipulation in wholesale electricity transrnission.92 The 
Act empowers FERC to impose "civil penalties" for violation of these 
rules. 
The U.S. experience then suggests first that, to the extent possible, the 
system should permit and encourage self-regulation. Thus, a broadly 
representative private organization should develop the conduct rules and 
enforce them. On the other hand, government regulators should not be far 
removed. They must monitor these self-regulatory efforts. These 
monitoring activities might take place at all governmental levels-federal, 
state, and local. Cooperation in monitoring, as opposed to direct 
regulation, adds effectiveness as well as uniformity. Monitoring is then the 
most efficient and effective regulatory role on both sides of the ocean. 
Both systems should gravitate in that direction. The United States may be 
coming at a new governmental role from a different direction than Europe, 
but it is hard to say it is ahead. It may simply have done more to dismantle 
and reconceive its direct regulation. 
E. Access to Information 
Information is the key to a viable electricity market and to preventing 
market manipulation. Thus, FERC, in Order 889 (accompanying the Open 
Access Order, Order 888), added rules establishing and governing an Open 
Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS).93 Its introduction 
summarizes the rules: 
[E]ach public utility (or its agent) that owns, controls, or operates facilities 
91. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. See generally 
Heather Curlee, Examining EPAct 2005: A Prospective Look at the Changing Regulatory 
Approach of the FERC, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1649 (2006). 
92. 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2006). 
93. Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information 
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 1996). 
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used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce will be 
required to create or participate in an OASIS that will provide open access 
transmission customers and potential open access transmission customers 
with information, provided by electronic means, about available transmission 
capacity, prices, and other information that will enable them to obtain open 
access non-discriminatory transmission service.94 
OASIS has proven a great success. The participation through ISO/RTO 
operations has contributed greatly to its success. 
A look at any of the ISO/RTO websites will show easy access to pricing 
and service information. Readily available price and other market 
information are necessary for the adequate function of the complex and 
immediate electricity market. Electronic capacity is also key to 
collaborative governance. It fosters broad stakeholder involvement as well 
as effective market monitoring. While there is still some information 
asymmetry, it has been largely eliminated in ISO/RTO regimes. Moreover, 
ISO/RTO implementation makes enforcement of transparency 
requirements more effective and efficient. 
F. Reliability and Long-Term Planning 
Reliability and supply security are consistently at the forefront of 
industry design in both the EU and the U.S. systems. These problems must 
be and have been attacked in a variety of ways. Organizational design is 
one of these. The market approach and the competition it engenders make 
long-term capital investment risky. Few are willing to speculate on loads 
that might appear some distance in the future. Coordinated long-term 
facility planning always creates a dangerous potential for collusion and 
discrimination. On the other hand, central government planning presents 
its own dangers. As noted Harvard economist William Hogan observed, 
Mandated investments not supported by market signals reveal or create 
requirements for expanding the scope of central planning and regulatory 
rather than market decisions. [Because all] investments change the 
economics of all other investments; mandated investments tend to reinforce 
the distortions in price signals; the regulatory cure could be worse than the 
market disease.95 
Among other things, an organizational design must be found that will 
plan without compromising the market. Again, collaborative governance 
seems to have proven to be the best foundation for that design. Because the 
grids are necessarily interconnected, security and reliability are national or 
94. !d. (emphasis added). 
95. WILLIAM W. HOGAN, ELECTRICITY MARKET HYBRIDS: MIXED MARKET DESIGN, 
REGULATION AND INVESTMENT 21 (2008), 
http:/ /ksghome.harvard.edu/-whogan/Hogan_AEEE_O 11708.pdf. 
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at least multistate problems. The larger and more multifaceted ISO/R TOs 
can afford both to engage in long-term planning and carry forward the 
results of those plans. For example, the !SO-centered Argentine Approach 
has proven very successful in generating transmission investment.96 An 
ISO/RTO also has the scope to better protect its customers from immediate 
breakdowns. For example, PJM was able to stop at the boundaries of its 
grid the great Midwestern blackout a few years ago. Interestingly, the 
breakdown stopped not at a state border but at the grid-management border. 
Collaborative governance has had further impact on supply security in 
the United States. The North American Energy Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) is another private governmental-type entity that has become an 
effective planning and load security mechanism.97 NERC evolved from a 
voluntary organization among industry members, began in the early 1960s 
as the industry's effort to assure reliability among interconnected 
transmission systems in North America. NERC describes itself as, "an 
international, independent, self-regulatory, not-for-profit organization, 
whose mission is to improve the reliability and security of the bulk power 
system in the United States, Canada and part of Mexico."98 It oversees 
reliability for a bulk power system for 334 million people, 830 gigawatts, 
340,000 km long and $1 trillion dollars (U.S.) assets. Restructuring 
naturally brought a distrust of an industry-dominated organization and 
hence NERC began to insulate itself. In 2006, FERC certified NERC as 
the "electricity reliability organization" for the United States and an 
agreement was reached with the Canadian industry and reliability 
organization.99 It now fits even more perfectly into the collaborative 
governance model. 
The EP Act gave FERC new powers to oversee mandatory reliability 
standards governing the nation's electricity grid. In order to carry out this 
responsibility, FERC certified an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) 
and established the procedures for the establishment, approval, and 
enforcement of mandatory reliability standards. 100 The Commission-
approved mandatory standards will rely heavily on NERC standards. 101 The 
96. !d. at 22 (quoting findings that "over the period 1993-2003 . . . transmission 
capacity limits increased by I 05 per cent, more than sufficient to meet the increase in 
system demand of over 50 per cent."). Stephen C. Littlechild & Carlos J. Skerk, "Regulation 
of Transmission Expansion in Argentina Part I: State Ownership, Reform and the Fourth 
Line," CMI EP 61 2004, at 56. 
97. North American Energy Reliability Corporation, http://www.nerc.com/. 
98. NERC, "Fast Facts," http://www.nerc.com/about/fast_facts.html. 
99. The original organization became the National Electricity Reliability Council in 
1968 and then the North American Electricity Reliability Council in 1981 and the current 
"Corporation" in 2007. 
100. 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2006). 
101. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Staffs Preliminary Assessment of the 
100 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [6l:SE 
Act charges FERC to reform transmission pricing so as to promote 
investment in electricity infrastructure. 102 
Bulk transmission reliability faces political barriers that must be 
mentioned even though they are beyond the scope of this piece. The EP Act 
delegated new federal "siting" powers to FERC and the Department of 
Energy (DOE). 103 It charges DOE to periodically study transmission 
congestion and designated, if necessary, National Interest Electric 
Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). 104 These powers will bring the federal 
government in direct conflict with state and local authorities. 105 It is likely 
that ISO/RTOs will have the local contacts that will ease the tensions for 
those within their jurisdiction. 
Throughout the various EU legislative and administrative stages, 
concern for the adequacy of electricity supply is apparent. Both the Treaty 
of Lisbon106 and the third package focus on this problem. While the 
collaborative governance model may well provide the best organizational 
design, many other elements must be put in place to solve these problems in 
Europe as in the United States. These other elements are beyond the scope of 
this piece. It is within the spirit of this discussion, however, to observe that 
nowhere is a transatlantic (and/or global) dialogue more necessary. 
G. Industry- and Market-Participant-Driven Collaborative Governance 
Creates Motivations Toward Conservation and Alternative Fuels 
An efficient market optimizes the allocation of scarce resources. In the 
United States, "demand response" programs by RTO/ISO are lowering the 
demand for electricity. Their networks enable real-time balance of 
generation and delivery, and this technology replaces some generation. A 
North American Electricity Reliability Council's Proposed Mandatory Reliability Standards, 
http://www. ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/05-11-06-nerc-assessment. pdf#xml=http:/ /search.ato 
mz.com/search/pdfhelper.tk?sp_o= I 0, I 00000,0. 
102. However, pricing in order to benefit investment in bulktransmission facilities 
presents serious problems. Indeed, that is why a simple market approach has not emerged. 
103. Among other things, the Energy Policy Act of2005 (EPAct), Pub. L. No. 109-58, 
119 Stat. 594, amending the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824p. 
104. FERC has adopted rules for filing applications for transmission construction. DOE 
has now identified two critical congestions areas: the "Mid-Atlantic NIETC" covers all of 
New Jersey, Delaware, and D.C., most of New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West 
Virginia, and substantial portions of northern Virginia and eastern Ohio; the "Southwest 
NIETC" covers parts of southern California and Arizona. 
105. State public utility commissions and other officials testified against the two 
corridors. E.g., Commonwealth of Virginia, Application for Rehearing of DOE Designation 
Order, Docket Nos. 2007-0E-01, 2007-0E-02 (Nov. 5, 2007). Largely because of these 
objections, DOE has ordered rehearing. National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor 
Designation Order, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,202 (Dec. 7, 2007). 
106. The Treaty of Lisbon would add TFEU section 176A, which is intended, among 
other things, to "ensure security of energy supply in the Union." 176A I (b). 
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recently released study, Harnessing the Power of Demand: How ISOs and 
RTOs Are Integrating Demand Response into Wholesale Electricity 
Market, shows the savings in electricity resources created by coordinated 
grid management. 107 It notes that the ten American grid operators, which 
serve two-thirds of U.S. customers, facilitate demand-response solutions by 
conservation in place of hard assets. They allow special design and load 
manipulation that may handle between 5% and 15% of peak load, reducing 
the need for additional generation and decreasing transmission 
congestion. 108 The devices for this demand response are varied and while 
demand-response alternatives may not necessarily be linked to the regional 
grid organizations, such organizations have obvious advantages in 
implementing them. 
ISO/RTOs also facilitate the development and utilization of renewables 
and alternative fuels. 109 Renewable power sources have their own adverse 
impacts and tend to be regionally feasible, intermittent, and seasonal. 
Wind power in the United States is most efficiently generated on the 
western prairie (where there are few consumers) or the coasts (where there 
are scenic pollution problems). Solar power also has inherent locational 
difficulties. Hydoelectric power not only destroys environments but is 
subject to climate variations. The large integrated grid facilitates a 
technology and geographic mix that optimizes alternative generation and 
mitigates their disadvantages. 
H. Collaborative Governance and "Third Countries" 
The U.S. model seems to facilitate combination with contiguous nations 
as well as U.S. states. As the DOE's "Grid Study" observed, the North 
107. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, HARNESSING THE POWER OF DEMAND: HOW ISOs AND RTOs 
ARE INTEGRATING DEMAND RESPONSE INTO WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2007), 
http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/% 7B5B4E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD% 7DIIRC 
_DR_Report_101607.pdf; see a/so STAFF REPORT, DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED 
METERING, at i, http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/09-07-demand-response.pdf. 
("Estimates of demand reductions in Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) and 
Independent System Operator (ISO) regions with organized wholesale markets lowered 
system peaks between 1.4 and 4.1 percent on these peak days. These demand reductions 
result from a combination of RTO/ISO demand response programs, utility retail demand 
response, and voluntary customer demand reductions."). 
108. Unless instant adjustments can be made in demand, assets must equal peak load. 
See PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRICITY UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COMPETIVE 
ERA 53 (1997) ("To meet the essential condition that total generation instantly equals total 
load, the power system in a given area must have a capacity as large as the highest moment 
of total use, or peak demand."). 
109. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, INCREASING DEMAND RESPONSE AND RENEWABLE RESOURCES: 
How ISOs AND RTOS ARE HELPING MEET IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES (2007), 
http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf/% 7B5B4E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD% 7DIIRC 
_Demand_Renewables_ Glossy. pdf. 
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American grid includes "the borders of Mexico and Canada." 110 Similarly, 
NERC describes itself as, "an international, independent, self-regulatory, 
not-for-profit organization, whose mission is to improve the reliability and 
security of the bulk power system in the United States, Canada and part of 
Mexico."'" Again, these cross-national borders' interconnections are 
voluntary and driven by technical and economic realities when they are not 
impeded by political borders. Perhaps the inclusiveness in the governance 
process makes this more palatable. 
The U.S. industry successfully joined regions of the Canadian industry 
in cross-border collaborative governance. Alberta and Ontario have their 
system operator, but Manitoba is within the Midwest ISO along with a 
number of U.S. states. 112 In fact, this formal joint-organization 
membership understates the coordination between the United States and 
Canada. Much of this cooperation is conducted by ISO/RTOs in both 
countries. Indeed, the regional organization greatly facilitates this 
cooperation. While electricity crosses the border between the United States 
and Mexico, the arrangements seem less transparent. 
In the United States, practicality compelled joint efforts in advancement 
of organizational accommodates. The same forces seem at work 
in Europe. For example, in the winter of 2008, France announced its 
intention to form a "Mediterranean Union." As the Mediterranean 
Electricity Ring map in the Final Report on the Implementation of TEN-E 
projects shows, 113 in electricity that union is well underway. Exchange 
among contiguous national industries seems irresistible. 
The Green Paper recognized that the European Union, as all of us, must 
see its energy task in a global and certainly neighborly perspective. 115 On 
the other hand, the Internal Market Proposal provides that "[the] 
commission proposes a requirement that third country individuals and 
countries cannot acquire control over a Community transmission system or 
transmission system operator unless this is permitted by an agreement 
between the EU and the third country."" 6 Relevant to this paper, the 
Commission also offers, "It may ultimately help to create supra-national 
transmission operators as the operators are no longer held back by mutual 
110. Grid Study, supra note 77, at 2-3 (emphasis added). 
111. NERC "Fast Facts," supra note 98 (emphases added). 
112. Midwest ISO, http://www.midwestiso.org/page/About%20Us. 
113. Final Report, Implementation of TEN-E projects (2004-2006): Evaluation and 
Analysis, fig. I 0, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/studies/doc/2007 _1l_ten_e_evaluation.pdf (figure 
10 is located on page 61 of the report). 
115. Electricity Green Paper, supra note 3, at 19-20 (concrete proposal 6). 
116. Internal Market Proposal, supra note 3, at 7. 
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mistrust."m The U.S. experience with North American ISO/RTOs suggests 
a model that will indeed enhance trust in a transnational industry. 
Ownership dilemma may be lessened if the operation of the grids within 
the European Union are managed by a transparent and inclusive 
collaborative governance organization. 
117. /d. at 7. 
